Sovereign Immunity Bars Student from Treble Damage Award After Sexual Assault by School Employee

Photo Source: Garfield High School student leaders Sarahi Bahena, left, and Edith Ramirez, both seniors, wait to greet freshmen arriving for their first time on the East L.A. campus, April 2021. (Al Seib/Los Angeles Times)

In a battle of the statutes regarding the award of treble damages to a 14-year-old sexual assault victim by a school employee, the school district won. The court found the award to be punitive rather than compensatory and ruled that since the school is a public entity entitled to sovereign immunity, treble damages are not permitted.

In an opinion written for Division Three of the California Court of Appeals, Associate Justice Anne H. Egerton reviewed the petition for a writ of mandate from the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). In her interpretation of the two statutes governing treble damage awards, she found that the Los Angeles Superior Court had erred when it decided that the award sought by the victim was meant to compensate her, rather than to punish the school for covering up the employee’s previous sexual assault on a different student.

Egerton’s opinion reviewed the two competing statutes, which include the Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1 that authorized “’up to treble damages’ in a tort action for childhood sexual assault where the assault occurred “’as a result of a cover-up’.” However the prevailing statute, she ruled, is Government Code section 818, which exempts a public entity from an award of damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. Thus, LAUSD has sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff Jane Doe was 14 years old when she was allegedly assaulted by defendant Daniel Garcia, an LAUSD employee who was an aide in two of the plaintiff’s classes. Garcia had been transferred to Doe’s school after he had been involved in a “boyfriend-girlfriend relationship” with H.M., another minor student. LAUSD transferred him instead of terminating his employment.

Garcia’s sexual abuse took place in November 2014. But because of his “threats and coercion,” Doe did not tell her parents about it until March 2016. As soon as they learned of it, they reported it to the police and in May 2016, Garcia was arrested and charged with criminal offenses.

In April 2017, Doe sued LAUSD and requested an award for “economic and noneconomic damages” and treble damages for what she considered a “cover-up.” Her complaint against the school district asserted “negligent hiring, supervision and retention of an unfit employee; breach of mandatory duty to report suspected child abuse; negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; and negligent supervision of a minor.” LAUSD moved to strike the treble damages portion of her complaint.

LAUSD filed for a writ of mandate, asking the Court of Appeals to correct the trial court’s decision and make them follow the law. Egerton wrote that the trial court erred.

In support of her request for treble damages, Doe cited a portion of the legislation that created the relevant statute. The bill’s author, Lorena Gonzales (D-San Diego), said the bill would “confront the pervasive problem of cover-ups in institutions, from schools to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. “ She argued, “This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims-and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light-and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.”

Egerton was not persuaded by this strong public policy argument, dismissing it, in part, because Gonzalez’s argument “appears to be the only reference to compensation related to treble damages in all the legislative history materials the parties have offered.” It seems that quantity trumped quality in this portion of her opinion. She also cited precedent that required the plaintiff to “identify what injury these treble damages are needed to compensate,” which she did not do. Also, the argument was not “an unambiguous expression of the Legislature’s intent,” which was necessary.

The trial court, on the other hand, had denied LAUSD’s motion to strike Doe’s request. They reasoned that treble damages were not designed to punish the cover-up but to compensate victims. Egerton, however, reasoned that Doe had already been sufficiently compensated because of “The general rule of damages in tort.” That rule says the injured party may recover for “all detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or not.” After reviewing the record, Egerton concluded, “we are unable to discern any uncompensated injury or unfulfilled right to compensation.”

Egerton was not unsympathetic to Doe’s plight. She noted how “child sexual assault inflicts grave harm on its vulnerable victims” especially when an assault resulted from a “deliberate coverup” that was supposed to protect its young charges. But she quickly switched gears and reverted to a strict interpretation of the statute. Doe, she wrote, had already received compensation for her “psychological trauma.” Her reasoning was based on both the statute’s legislative history and by plaintiff’s inability to cite other than a compensatory function for a treble damage award.

Section 340, she wrote, “unambiguously demonstrated that the purpose of treble damage’s purpose is to deter further cover-ups by punishing past ones in a tort action.” But treble damages, she wrote, “are primarily exemplary and punitive and a public entity like LAUSD maintains sovereign immunity from liability.” The justice cited several sections of the Government Tort Claims Act to support her decision. This included a reference to Section 818, the relevant statute that says very plainly, “a plaintiff who alleges injury caused by a public entity may be entitled to actual damages for that injury, but not punitive damages.”

Egerton also dismissed Doe’s public policy arguments that said it is “a legislative imperative to bring past childhood sexual abuse to light, and … treble damages advance this objective by offering victims an incentive to come forward.” Despite her agreement with the public policy goals, she again relied on Supreme Court cases that make it clear that actual, but not punitive, damages are allowed.

With no dissent, the court granted LAUSD’s writ and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the school district’s motion to strike the treble damages request.